

Message Text

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51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 NEA-14 IO-14 EURE-00 ISO-00 ACDA-19

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SS-20 USIA-15 EB-12 CIEP-03 COME-00 TRSE-00 INT-08

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3017

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

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AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

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E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UR, HU
SUBJ: KADAR VISIT WRAP-UP

REF: LEINGRAD 0937

1. SUMMARY. THE OFFICIAL PART OF THE KADAR VISIT (SEPTEMBER 25-30) IS OVER, THOUGH KADAR AND HIS WIFE ARE STAYING ON FOR A REST. SOVIET TREATMENT OF THE VISIT INDICATES A DESIRE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT KADAR IS STILL MOSCOW'S MAN. THE WORDING OF THE COMMUNIQUE SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT KADAR MAY HAVE HAD TO PAY A PRICE FOR SOVIET SUPPORT -- FURTHER LIMITATION OF HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. THE SOVIETS SEEMED INTENT ON LEAVING NO DOUBT THAT KADAR CONTINUES TO ENJOY THEIR FULLSUPPORT. WHILE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HARD TO TOP THE ORDER OF LENIN (WHICH HE RECEIVED DURING BREZHNEV'S 1972 VISIT TO HUNGARY), HE ENJOYED SUPREME VIP TREATMENT THROUGHOUT THIS VISIT. BREZHNEV TOASTED HIM AS A SEASONED REVOLUTIONARY, AN OUTSTANDING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST, AND A LOYAL FRIEND -- A PASSAGE THAT GOT THE ONLY "PROLONGED APPLAUSE" IN THE BODY OF THE WHOLE TOAST. EVEN SUSLOV, THE GUARDIAN OF SOVIET ORTHODOXY, WAS EFFUSIVE IN LEFINGRAD, MENTIONING KADAR NO FEWER THAN FOUR TIMES IN A SHORT SPEECH. THE COMMUNIQUE GAVE MORE OR LESS EQUAL TREATMENT TO BREZHNEV AND TO KADAR, AND HAD THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP NOTING THE "EFFECTIVE AND CREATIVE LEADERSHIP" OF THE HSWP AND ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEADED BY KADAR. THE NEWSPAPERS FRONT-PAGED PICTURES OF BREZHNEV AND KADAR TETE-A-TETE, THE LENINGRAD RECEPTION WAS FIRST-CLASS (REFTEL), AND THE VARIOUS ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES BROUGHT OUT ELITE GROUPS (INCLUDING MRS. BREZHNEV, IN SEVERAL OF HER RARE PUBLIC APPEARANCES).

3. APART FROM THE STRONG PERSONALITY SIGNALS, THE BILATERAL ASPECTS OF THE VISIT PRESENT A CLOUDIER PICTURE. KADAR WAS FULSOME IN HIS COMPLIMENTS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, EVEN TO THE POINT OF PRAISING SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN 1956. THE SOVIET APPROACH STRUCK US AS SOMEWHAT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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COOLER. WHILE THE COMMUNIQUE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TALKS LEFT NO CHINKS FOR DIFFERENCES TO BE SURMISED, THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME CAUTIONARY LANGUAGE FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. IN NOTING UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESSES IN HIS TOAST, BREZHNEV SAID, "IT IS QUITE NATURAL...THAT WE CONSULT EACH OTHER AND JOINTLY LOOK FOR OPTIMUM SOLUTIONS"-- A STATEMENT SMACKING OF PATERNALISM (AND ONE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR THE ROMANIANS

AS WELL). MOREOVER, AS WITH THE 1972 MEETING, THE SOVIETS DID NOT MENTION THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, AND WERE INDEED VERY SPARING IN THEIR COMMENTS ABOUT HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC POLICIES IN GENERAL. THE EMPHASIS RATHER, WAS ALL ON COORDINATED AND JOINT ECONOMIC EFFORTS.

4. THE COMMUNIQUE MAKES A VERY STRONG PITCH FOR CONTINUED AND EXPANDED HUNGARIAN TIES IN CEMA, AND PARTICULARLY FOR COORDINATED SOVIET-HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC PLANNING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CEMA'S SOVIET-DIRECTED COMPLEX PROGRAM. (GOSPLAN CHIEF BAYBAKOV PARTICIPATED IN THE TALKS.) THE THEME APPEARS TO BE THAT THE LEVEL OF HUNGARIAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND HUNGARY'S ROLE IN CEMA ARE SATISFACTORY, BUT THAT MUCH MORE MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED. THUS THE GROWTH RATE OF SOVIET-HUNGARIAN TRADE, COORDINATION OF SOVIET-HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC PLANNING AND "JOINT MEASURES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF FUEL AND ENERGY RESOURCES OF BOTH COUNTRIES" ARE ALL SAID TO BE ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, FURTHER WORK ON SOVIET-HUNGARIAN PLAN COORDINATION MUST TAKE PLACE AND THERE MUST BE "BROADER USE" OF NRE FORMS OF ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS PROPOSED BY THE CEMA COMPLEX PROGRAM. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO SAYS THAT "AGREEMENT WAS REACHED" THAT COMPETENT BODIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES WILL "MAKE BETTER USE OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT PLANNING" IN KEY AREAS AND TYPES OF PRODUCTION.

5. WE INTERPRET ALL THIS AS A FIRM, NO-NONSENSE SOVIET ASSERTION THAT HUNGARY'S NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM AND ITS JOINT VENTURES WITH WESTERN FIRMS MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH HUNGARIAN INVOLVEMENT IN CEMA AND HER ECONOMIC ALIGN-LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MENT WITH THE USSR. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW TRYING TO ACHIEVE ACCELERATION OF CEMA INTEGRATION THROUGH INTRICATE COORDINATION OF EACH COUNTRY'S 1975-80 ECONOMIC PLANS, PLUS THE POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE CEMA LINK WITH THE COMMON MARKET, MAKES IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT (IN SOVIET EYES) THAT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE CORRECT POSITION ON THESE ISSUES. THE REFERENCE TO JOINT ACTION ON FUEL AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING AS A NOT VERY SUBTLE REMINDER OF HUNGARY'S VULNERABILITY AND DEPENDENCE IN THIS AREA, SINCE OF THE TWO PARTNERS TAKING "JOINT ACTION," ONE, THE USSR, HAS VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE RESOURCES.

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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6. DURING HS STAY, KADAR TWICE MADE POSITIVE SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO A EUROPEAN AND A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. BREZHNEV, IN HIS TOAST, DID NOT -- A POSITION WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET STRATEGY OF LETTING OTHERS CARRY THE BALL ON THE CONFERENCES. THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE WAS GUARDED, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE FORMS OF WORK BY PARTIES "IN BOTH THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FRAMEWORK" AND THE READINESS OF THE TWO PARTIES TO SUPPORT PRACTICAL STEPS IN THAT DIRECTION. WE ARE STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT KADAR WAS EXTREMELY CIRCUMSPECT ABOUT TIMING. IN MOSCOW HE SPOKE OF "TIMELY" REGIONAL MEETINGS AND THE "GRADUAL" PREPARATION OF A WORLD CONFERENCE; IN LENINGRAD HE SPOKE OF "PREPARATIONS TOWARD" A WORLD CONFERENCE AND OF "PREPARING AND THEN CALLING" A EUROPEAN ONE. THIS MAY BE AN INDICATION THAT THE TIMETABLE FOR THESE MEETINGS IS SLIPPING STILL FURTHER.

7. THE SOVIETS ALSO LET KADAR DO MOST OF THE CRITICIZING OF CHINA, WHICH HE DID INDIRECTLY IN BOTH PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THUS ALLOWING MOSCOW TO ADOPT A POSTURE OF REASONABLENESS FOR THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PRC (SEPTEL). BREZHNEV DID NOT REFER TO CHINA IN HIS TOAST, BUT SOME ANTI-CHINESE LANGUAGE DID CREEP INTO THE COMMUNIQUE'S REFERENCE TO THE "STRUGGLE AGAINST EACH AND EVERY MANIFESTATION OF ANTI-COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM, AND CHAUVINISM, AGAINST RIGHT AND LEFT OPPORTUNISM."

8. THE COMMUNIQUE PLACED FAIRLY HEAVY EMPHASIS ON IDEOLOGY -- NO DOUBT A REFLECTION OF THE FACT THAT SUSLOV PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE VISIT. THE EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF "JOINT WORK" IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY IS CERTAINLY SUSLOVIAN. CURIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE REFERENCE LATER IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO "IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSIONS AGAINST SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" IS TREATED AS IF IT HAD CONSEQUENCES ONLY FOR FOREIGN, BUT NOT FOR INTERNAL, POLICIES. THE COMMUNIQUE CALLS FOR A SOCIALIST RESPONSE THROUGH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS; IT DOES NOT CALL FOR HEIGHTENED INTERNAL VIGILANCE.

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9. ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, KADAR DID A LOT OF SPEAR-CARRYING FOR THE SOVIETS. HE TWICE REFERRED TO THE

IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, AND THE COMMUNIQUE ADUMBRATED STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS ON (INTER ALIA) CYRUS, ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, AND CSCE. THERE WERE SOME INTERESTING TWISTS. THE TREATMENT OF CSCE WAS UNCHARACTERISTICALLY OPTIMISTIC; IT OMITTED ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO WESTERN FOOT-DRAWING AND IT EXPRESSED ONLY SLIGHTLY QUALIFIED CONFIDENCE IN EARLY AGREEMENT ON ALL QUESTIONS AT ISSUE. THE REFERENCE TO MBFR INCLUDED A STATEMENT THAT SUCCESS WOULD CREATE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH TALKS "ON OTHER REGIONS IN EUROPE" -- PRESUMABLY THE SOUTHERN TIER. THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION PLUMPED FOR "FULL AND EQUAL (POLNOPRAVNOYE) PARTICIPATION" OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES AT GENEVA; THIS IS A SLIGHT CHANGE FROM GROMYKO'S UNGA FORMULATION OF A "FULL AND EQUAL PLACE" FOR THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES.

10. KREMLIN-WATCHER WILL NOTE THAT MISSING FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE KADAR FESTIVITIES WERE SOVIET POLIBURO MEMBERS KIRILENKO, ANDROPOV, MAZUROV, AND PELSHE.
DUBS

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